Imagine you are Michael Harding. As you lie injured on the road, you are told that a brain scanner is going to be used to map your memories and personality, and the information used to program the brain of a new body cloned from one of your own cells. The moment the new ‘you’ gains consciousness, the old ‘you’ will be painlessly destroyed. How do you feel about that prospect? – Justify your answer by reference to one of the competing philosophical accounts of the relation between mind and body.
The philosophical perspective from which I will address this question will be that of a mind-brain identity monist with a realist / materialist metaphysics.
How I would feel about the suggested procedure would depend a lot on the details of the “mind-transfer” procedure. From my subjective perspective, my personal identity consists of a remembered continuity of point-of-view. As long as the mind-transfer procedure ensured that there would be no break in the apparent continuity of memory at any stage of the process, I would have no problem undergoing the process. However, I would not be able to accept the process if there is any chance that — (a) the Michael Harding (new) is conscious at the same time as the Michael Harding (old); or (b) the Michael Harding (new) loses any of the continuity of memory of the Michael Harding (old).
If what “I” am is a remembered continuity of point-of-view, then it should not matter to me if my physical existence is destroyed, and I am recreated anew in some other place (and/or time). As long, that is, there is no possibility that “I” might stay behind while a “copy” gets created at the destination. Note the asymmetry to this restriction. “I” don’t care if a copy gets created at the destination, and a copy gets left behind. Just as long as “I”(my remembered continuity of point-of-view) am not the one left behind. Now given the limited information provided in the question, it is left unspecified whether Michael Harding (old) will continue to experience after the brain-scan event. If he does not, then there will be no apparent break in the remembered continuity of point-of-view between the Michael Harding (old) and the Michael Harding (new). But if he does, then there will be an unacceptable fracture of continuity between the (old) and the (new).
My (Michael Harding — old) subjective perspective is my particular point-of-view from this particular spatial/temporal position. It is not possible (in spatial/temporal terms) for the Michael Harding (new) to be me so long as my current point-of-view still exists. Even if the existence of the MH(new) is only potential. From my current subjective perspective, the MH(new) will lack some of what makes me me. He will lack the memory of my experiences since the brain scan. Therefore MH(new) will not be me.
All of which, of course, will not prevent the new Michael Harding from insisting that he does indeed have a fractureless remembered continuity of point-of-view. But that is irrelevant.
