Critically examine the fatalist view, according to which statements about the future have a definite truth value now. Compare the theory of fatalism with the thesis of determinism. Is there any way that one could consistently hold a determinist view while denying fatalism, or hold a fatalist view while denying determinism?
From a review of what literature I can find, it appears to me that there are two different notions of Fatalism. There is what I might refer to as “Pop Fatalism”, and there is what I might refer to as “Philosophical Fatalism”.
Pop Fatalism is a rather loosely conceived kind of fatalism that treats some statements about the future as true, while allowing that other statements about the future are indeterminate. This is the “pop psychology” kind of fatalism that argues there is no point in worrying, or working hard, or striving for better things, because the future is set and “what will be, will be”. If there is a bullet with “your name on it”, there is no point in running and hiding when the fireworks start. The thing is going to find you no matter where you hide. The argument is based on the premise that regardless of what you do, or how hard you struggle, you cannot affect a future that is already predetermined. The hidden fallacy is that the reasoning regards the future as determined independently of whatever you might do about it, and that whatever you might do is somehow not part of that determined future. It regards some “significant” statements about the future as true now, while considering statements about what you are going to do between now and then, the kinds of things that are going to cause the future, as indeterminate. Hence, this kind of fatalism is inconsistent in its application of truth values to statements about the future. Because of this logical inconsistency, I will ignore the “pop psychology” notion of Fatalism for the rest of this essay, and deal instead only with the more interesting notion of Philosophical Fatalism.
Philosophical Fatalism is consistent in maintaining that all statements about the future have truth values now. There are two primary arguments for Philosophical Fatalism. One is theological, and one is metaphysical. The theological argument reasons that since God is omniscient and timeless, God therefore already knows all that will happen. Therefore God knows the truth of all statements about the future. Therefore statements about the future have definite truth values now.
The metaphysical argument for Fatalism reasons from the premises of Determinism. Metaphysical determinism is the doctrine that all things have causes, and those causes are deterministic (ie. not random). Without this assumption, it is argued, all prediction would be impossible and all reasoning would be futile. If all things have causes, and all causes temporally precede their affects, then the World at any instant is fully determined by the causes extant in the immediately preceding instant. Hence, by generalizing to all instants, the future is predetermined and fixed, given the causes that are currently extant. Hence any statement about the future is now already true or false according to the inevitable affects of the causes that are currently extant.
Philosophical Fatalism therefore asserts that the future is (in one sense) inevitable, given the physical, social, and individual forces, actions, choices, and decisions that actually have taken and are currently taking place. But this does not entail that this future can be known in advance. There is an enormous difference between “exists”and “knowable”. More importantly, Philosophical Fatalism does not assert that a given future will unfold regardless of what you or I may do to promote or prevent it (the assumption implicit in Pop Fatalism). The future is what we choose to make it. Determinism (and hence Philosophical Fatalism) merely argues that our choices are not uncaused. Our futures will be determined by our histories.
The notion of Fatalism is quite inconsistent with an Anti-Realist concept of truth that relies on the knowability or verifiability of statements for their truth values. Even given a Deterministic metaphysical view of the nature of Reality, there is now no sort of evidence currently extant that can be considered as a possible basis of knowing or verifying now whether some statement about the future is true or false. To an Anti-Realist about truth, therefore, all statements about the future must remain indeterminate. Philosophical Fatalism (of either basis) requires a Realist concept of truth. The notion relies on the concept that there is something independent of us that already exists now to render statements about the future true or false independent of any awareness or knowledge of it.
The notion of Fatalism is also quite inconsistent with any metaphysical doctrine that maintains that the future does not yet exist because it has not been “created” yet (leaving vague what constitutes “creation” in this context). Even given a Realist view of Truth, if the future does not yet exist, there would not now be anything in existence that would render a statement about the future true or false. To an Anti-Realist about the existence of the future, therefore, all statements about the future must remain indeterminate.
The notion of Fatalism is, as well, quite inconsistent with any metaphysical doctrine that is inconsistent with the causative principles of Determinism (such as Free Will Libertarianism). If there currently exists sources of future actions or events (such as an unconstrained human Will) that are not being caused by extant causes now in play, then the future cannot be considered to be determined. If, for example, the human Free Will is uncaused (or otherwise unpredictable even in principle), then no matter what statement is made about the future, it is conceivable that some human action can render the statement true or false at will. Hence all statements about the future must remain indeterminate. Therefore it would not be logically consistent to hold a fatalist view while denying determinism.
The notion of Fatalism is, on the other hand, consistent with most versions of “Fuzzy” Determinism. There are a number of versions of metaphysical determinism that include with the doctrine that all things are deterministically caused, some source of randomness — such as quantum indeterminacy. As long as the particular source of randomness generates only small scale indeterminacy over short time scales, then Fatalism can still maintain that most statements about the nearer future are true or false now. Just how big a proportion of all possible statements constitutes “most” and just how far into the future constitutes “nearer”, will of course be dependent on the exact nature of the randomness contributed. The “fuzziness” contributed by quantum indeterminacy, as one example, will remain completely invisible in almost all circumstances, over almost all time scales relevant to human events. So a Fatalism that is consistent with Quantum Fuzzy Determinism can allow that most statements about the nearer future are true or false now, and the limits of the fatalist scope are determined by the how fuzzy the quantum effects make the macroscopic events.
In summary, the theory of Philosophical Fatalism, in order to remain consistent, requires more than simply metaphysical Determinism (or the less “fuzzy”of the Fuzzy Determinist theories). It requires a Realist theory of Truth — so that statements about the future can be rendered True or False independent of our being able to know or verify their truth values. And it requires a Realist notion of the future — so that there can exist (in some manner) future states of affairs that can render statements true or false in a Realist sense.
All three constituents are necessary to prevent Philosophical Fatalism from degenerating into Pop Fatalism. Lacking any one of the three, and the truth of statements about the future is indeterminate. They are also sufficient. Given metaphysical determinism, a realist theory of truth, and a realist notion of the future, then Philosophical Fatalism is logically entailed. Therefore it would be logically consistent to hold a determinist view while denying fatalism only if one held either an Anti-Realist concept of truth, or an Anti-Realist notion of the future (or both, of course).
