Evolutionary Pragmatist Ethics
Philosophy – 1 a. Love and pursuit of wisdom by intellectual means and moral self-discipline. b. The investigation of causes and laws underlying reality. c. A system of philosophical inquiry or demonstration. 2. Inquiry into the nature of things based on logical reasoning rather than empirical methods. 3. The critique and analysis of fundamental beliefs as they come to be conceptualized and formulated. 7. The science comprising logic, ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, and epistemology. 10. The system of values by which one lives: a philosophy of life.”(1)
Ethics – 1. the discipline of dealing with what is good and bad, and with moral duty and obligation. 2. a set of moral principles or values; the principles of conduct governing an individual or group.”
Principle – 1. a comprehensive and fundamental law, doctrine or assumption; fundamental truth as a basis for reasoning. 2. a primary source. 3. general law as a guide to action; personal code of right conduct.”
Moral – concerned with the goodness or badness of character or disposition, or with the distinction between right and wrong; dealing with regulation of conduct; concerned with the rules of morality; founded on moral law; capable of moral action.
“Summum bonum” is a Latin translation of an ancient Egyptian expression meaning “the highest good.” It was introduced by Cicero into Greek philosophy to denote Plato’s notion of “The Form of the Good”. Plato introduced his notion of “The Form of the Good” in a conversation between Glaucon and Socrates in his “The Republic”(2) Following the nature of Platonic Ideals, the summum bonum is thus generally thought of as being an end in itself, and at the same time containing all other Goods.
Aristotle, in his Nichomachean Ethics, accepted that the target of human activity, “Must be the ‘Good’, that is, the supreme good.”(3) Aristotle reasoned that the one goal man has always sought for, as his ultimate end, is happiness. In exploring that understanding, he comes to realize that humanity’s greatest good is, in fact, joy. All else should be a means to that end. Achieving the summum bonum, or life’s greatest good, or joy, is the result of turning one’s potentialities and purposes into actualities. Similar to Aristotle’s theory of self-realization, when one fails to follow the path to achieve one’s own summum bonum it creates dissonance which produces the antithesis of joy: the emotional state of misery.
Over the course of centuries, various philosophies have defined and redefined the Summum Bonum in different ways. In the Thomist synthesis of Aristotelianism and Christianity, the highest good is usually defined as the life of the righteous or the life led in communion with God and according to God’s precepts. For Utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, the highest good is identified with the maximum possible psychological happiness for the maximum number of people. For Kant’s rational Deontologism, the highest good is identified with virtue or duty. For the modern version of Eudaemonism or Virtue Ethics, the highest good is identified with “flourishing”.
This essay seeks to develop an understanding of how Evolutionary Pragmatism defines the concept of the Summum Bonum. In Part 1 of this Essay, I will do this by starting with a basic premise, adding some fundamental definitions, and throwing in some empirical observations, to reach a fundamental conclusion. In Part 2 of this essay, I will deal with some of the objections that have been raised to the conclusions I have drawn.
Part 1 — The Summum Bonum
Premise 1: The First Axiom of Evolutionary Pragmatism is that Reality is objective (independent of any observer), constant (permits repeatable observations) and self-consistent (does not exhibit mutually contradictory cause-effect relationships). In other words, the world is real and is what it is, independently of how we think about it. If you doubt the reasonableness and rationale of this premise, then you must go back and reread the chapters on Metaphysics, particularly The Nature of Reality, and The Metaphysical Challenge of Solipsism.
Conclusion 1: The Darwinian theory of the evolution of species (or more pedantically, the modern neo-Darwinian theory of evolution), is a sufficiently accurate description of how reality works that it can be accepted as true (enough) for the purposes of this discussion. If you doubt the reasonableness and rationale for this conclusion, then I refer you to the vast body of work in support of evolution, by numerous authors. In particular, I would recommend two sources: online see the evidence at http://www.darwinwasright.org/; and for a good book, see Why Evolution is True by Jerry A. Coyne. The evidentiary support for the theory of evolution by natural selection is vast, varied, and magnificent. At the web address cited, and in Jerry Coyne’s book, the scientific evidence (the collection of scientific facts) that support this amazing process is clearly outlined. Drawing from modern work in genetics, paleontology, geology, molecular biology, and anatomy the evidence demonstrates the “indelible stamp” of the processes first proposed by Darwin. The irrefutable scientific evidence demonstrates, “beyond a reasonable doubt”, that evolution is the right way to understand Reality. For a more detailed digression into an introduction to Genetic Theory, click here.
There are three Necessary Corollaries to this conclusion:
(1) Homo Sapiens Sapiens (“Man”) is an evolved species of life on Earth.
(2) You and I are members of this species, and are an evolved form of life.
(3) The rules describing the processes of evolution apply to our behaviours.
Definition: In evolutionary biology, the concept of “inclusive (genetic) fitness” is a metric of evolutionary success that was defined by W. D. Hamilton in 1964(4). “Inclusive genetic fitness” (IGF) is defined as the number of offspring equivalents an individual rears, rescues or otherwise supports through its behaviour (regardless of who begets them).
An individual’s own child, who carries one half of the individual’s unique genome, is defined as one offspring equivalent. A sibling’s child, or a grand-child, who will carry one-quarter of the individual’s genome, is thus 1/2 offspring equivalent. A cousin’s child, or a great-grand-child, who has 1/16 of the individual’s genome, is similarly 1/8 offspring equivalent. And so on. Notably, a stranger who carries no significant portion of the individual’s unique genome is defined as zero offspring equivalent. What matters here, is not the many millions or billions of DNA base-pairs that two different individuals may share in common. What matters is the unique combination of base-pair mutations that constitutes one particular individual, and what proportion of those unique base-pair mutations are shared with the other individual. It is certainly true that any two random strangers will inevitably share some portion of those base-pair mutations. But for the purposes of the study of population genetics, a proportion that falls below 1/256 is treated as being zero for all pratical purposes. That fraction happens to be the 8th degree of seperation.
Short-term inclusive genetic fitness measures this metric during the organism’s lifetime. Whatever decisions or actions an individual makes or does not make, impacts positively or negatively on that individual’s short-term inclusive genetic fitness. The more significant the decision or action, the more measurable that impact will be. (That is a circular definition, since the more measurable the impact, the more significant the decision/action.) If you wish to understand the impact on your (or any other individual’s) short-term genetic fitness, of any particular action or decision, you need to learn enough about the functioning of Reality to figure out what the consequences of those decisions or actions are, or likely will be.
Long-term inclusive genetic fitness (LTIGF) measures this metric from the vantage point of later generations. Either a current examination of past performance, or a current estimate of projected future performance. An offspring equivalent that an individual rears, rescues or otherwise supports through its behaviour does not count in the measure of the individual’s LTIGF if that off-spring does not in turn rear, rescue or otherwise support through its behaviour further offspring-equivalents. And so forth down through the generations. No matter how good at parenting Tyrannosaurus Rex might have been in their day, they score zero in long-term inclusive genetic fitness because there are no living descendants today. (Birds may be descendants of dinosaurs, but not of Tyrannosaurus Rex.) No matter how good you may be as a parent, if your currently projected off-spring equivalents do not inturn foster their own off-spring equivalents, your projected score for your long-term inclusive genetic fitness will be zero as well.
Definition Drawing upon recent results in Genomic Research(5)(6), a “gene” is defined as “a union of genomic sequences encoding a coherent set of potentially overlapping functional products”. To quote the authors: “Our definition sidesteps the complexities of regulation and transcription by removing the former altogether from the definition and arguing that final, functional gene products (rather than intermediate transcripts) should be used to group together entities associated with a single gene. It also manifests how integral the concept of biological function is in defining genes.”
This functionally based definition of a “gene” eliminates the problems associated with the identification of a particular sequence of DNA base-pairs as a gene. A structural based definition, relying on a particular sequence of base pairs, runs into problems with the large amount of apparently “junk” DNA in the human genome that has captured the attention of epigenetics. Calling such “apparently meaningless” sequences as “junk” and thus not “genes” simply labels the level of our ignorance. Focusing instead on the functional nature of “genes” leaves the meaning of so-called “junk” DNA to be discovered, or not, as science progresses. And it allows for the possibility of non-contiguous DNA sequences to be labeled as a “gene” if it performs the necessary functions.
Conclusion 2: From the gene’s point of view, evolutionary success (long term inclusive genetic fitness – LTIGF) ultimately depends on leaving behind the maximum number of copies of itself in the population. Hamilton showed mathematically that, because other members of a population may share one’s genes, a gene can also increase its evolutionary success by indirectly promoting the reproduction and survival of other individuals who also carry that gene. This is variously called “kin theory”, “kin selection theory” or “inclusive fitness theory”. The most obvious category of such individuals is close genetic relatives, and where these are concerned, the application of inclusive fitness theory is often more straightforwardly treated via the narrower kin selection theory. This is the genetic basis behind the historical fact that Homo Sapiens Sapiens (Man) has lived for most of his history within family Tribes.
Empirical Observation: There are always consequences that result from our behaviours. Even if our behaviour is ostensively to “do nothing”, that non-behaviour also entails consequences. In any situation, what we do or abstain from doing entails effects of greater or lesser significance. Even if we cannot predict in advance, or discern after the fact, whatever we do or don’t do causes ripples in the time stream. For every action or inaction we undertake, there are always other possible alternatives that we might have undertaken. Even if we have no idea what those alternatives might have been. It is hard enough to predict what the consequences might be for an alternative we actively consider. And we often discover that the actual consequences that result are nothing like what we expected. It is impossible to foresee what might be the consequences of an alternative we never even thought of. Hence, all of our actions or inactions result in consequences — even if we cannot foresee them, or detect them. And all of those consequences can be evaluated with regards to their desirability (given some scale of desirability, yet to be defined) — both before the fact when considering expected consequences, and after the fact when we know the actual consequences (or at least some of them).
Much of our behaviour is non-conscious, or involuntary. We have no (or at least very little) control over our non-conscious or involuntary behaviours. Hence we have no (or at least very little) control over what consequences result from such non-conscious or involuntary behaviours. But since non-conscious or involuntary behaviours are more or less out of our control, we can minimize the cost of evaluating the desirability of those consequences, if we ignore for the present, those consequences we cannot (to any great degree) control.
But some of our behaviours are conscious, and are the result of conscious choices. These behaviours are the ones that we are concerned about in this discussion.
Definition: A conscious choice is a selection of one action (or in-action) among a number of competing alternatives, according to some (yet to be defined) scale of desirability. And what is evaluated for desirability is the expected consequences of the proposed action. A choice is always made based on the expected consequences that are predicted to result. Even if your mind-set is to “go with the flow,” you at least have to evaluate the consequences enough to pick the alternative that does indeed “go with the flow.” A choice can also be evaluated ex post facto based on the consequences that actually did result. But that is a learning exercise, not an exercise in choice. We can use this after-the-fact information to improve the quality of our conscious choices.
It is a Necessary Corollary of the definition of a “conscious choice” that we have as an objective in making a choice to improve the desirability of the consequences of our choices. That is what a conscious choice is — selecting the alternative with the most desirable expected consequences. So after-the-fact (ex post facto) checking the desirability of the actual consequences is just a means of improving our ability to predict consequences, and make better choices.
Definition: Everybody, regardless of their intelligence, their education, their knowledge of Reality, their sanity, their philosophical awareness, or even their sobriety, makes decisions they firmly believe are more desirable according to some concept of “best”. And everybody has some form of concept of what is “best”. It may be different from individual to individual, and even from moment to moment. But everybody believes that “Doing the Desirable Thing, is Good”. They merely differ in what they consider is the appropriate measure of what is “Desirable”, and how they define “Good”. Everybody pays attention to the consequences of their behaviour. If they don’t, they sooner or later “fail to cross the street”. That kind of obliviousness to the behaviour of Reality is self-defeating, and self-correcting in the long run. People may pay attention to different consequences, and certainly measure the “desirability” of different consequences on different scales, but everybody makes behavioural choices with some attention to the desirability of those consequences. We individual humans are the end result of about 500 million years of practice at giving due consideration to the consequences at the genetic level. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that we also automatically do the same, to some degree, with some degree of success, on the conscious intellectual level.
To aid in our evaluation of the desirability of expected consequences, we have developed a set of rules and guidelines for what is “good” (more desirable) and what is “bad” (less desirable). We call these collections of rules and guidelines our “ethics” or our “morals”.
Ethics (or Morals), then, is defined as the collection of rules, guidelines, rules-of-thumb, or aphorisms that are intended to help us to, more often than not, successfully evaluate alternative potential behaviours for their desirability. The Second Axiom of Evolutionary Pragmatism, is that the purpose of Philosophy in general and Ethics in particular, is the establishment of basic guidelines and “rules of thumb” for determining which behaviours are most likely to promote the achievement of “The Best”, over the long-term.
Conclusion 3: Whatever other consequences might be intended, or might actually result, from our behavioral choices (or lack of choice) one of those consequences most relevant for our current discussion, is that any such choice (or lack thereof) will impact either positively or negatively, to some greater or lesser degree, on our LTIGF (Long Term Inclusive Genetic Fitness). Whatever else catches your attention when evaluating the desirability of expected or after-the-fact consequences, your actions or inactions will definitely generate consequences that have some impact (measureable or not, detectable or not) on your LTIGF.
For many of our behaviours, the likely consequences to our LTIGF will be sufficiently close to zero so it can be treated as zero for all practical purposes. These can be called “neutral” consequences. Most behavioural choices we make will have “neutral” consequences to our LTIGF. It is hard to imagine how your choice of a vanilla versus a chocolate ice cream cone would have a discernable impact on your LTIGF. So for all practical purposes, we can treat the impact of that choice as neutral. On the other hand, some of your behavioural choices will have a clear impact on your LTIGF — even if you cannot imagine just how that might come about. If you are already overweight, or suffering from high cholesterol, or diabetes, or some such, it is readily imaginable how the choice of having an ice cream cone or not might have a discernable impact on your LTIGF. If you see a wallet on the ground, one of the alternatives you will evaluate for desirability, will be the option of taking the wallet for yourself, and profiting from the contents. It is easily conceivable how that choice might result in a positive or negative impact on your LTIGF. However, the fact that from any choice of action or inaction, there necessarily will be consequences for our LTIGF (neutral or otherwise), does not imply that it will be easy, or even possible, to predict those consequences with any degree of accuracy.
The Most Fundamental Choice of All: What do you choose to use as your criteria of desirability? Against what standard will you choose to evaluate the desirability of consequences? In my discussion of Different Kinds of Ethics, I explore a number of different concepts that various philosophers have come up with to evaluate the desirability of consequences. But most people, not being philosophers, just use the “feels right” evaluation — some consequences just “feel right”, while other just “feel wrong”. But when you come right down to the nitty-gritty, at the most basic level, there are only two alternatives:
(i) you can choose a criteria of desirability that is in sync with your LTIGF; or
(ii) you can choose a criteria of desirability that is out of sync with your LTIGF.
If you choose option (i), then you are choosing a standard of good and right behaviour and desirable consequences that is in sync with over 4 billion years of evolution. You are choosing a standard of desirability that will help guide you towards behavioural choices that will positively impact your LTIGF. You are choosing the ultimate life for you and yours over the long term. The history of evolution has demonstrated that the future will be populated by those who choose (intentionally or accidentally) behaviours that actually do positively impact their own LTIGF. To intentionally choose a standard of desirability that will help you promote your own LTIGF, you are intentionally helping your own genetic proclivities ensure that you and yours will populate the future.
If you choose option (ii), then you are choosing a standard of good and right behaviour and desirable consequences that is in conflict with over 4 billion years of evolution, in conflict with the genetically programmed proclivities with which evolution has provided you. You are choosing a standard of desirability that will inevitably result in behavioural choices that will negatively impact your LTIGF. You are choosing the ultimate death of you and yours over the long term. Because the history of evolution has demonstrated that the future will be populated by those who choose (intentionally or accidentally) behaviours that actually do positively impact their own LTIGF — regardless of what their intent was, regardless of their choice of a criteria of desirability, and regardless of their awareness of what they are doing.
The Ultimate Decision: The ethics of Evolutionary Pragmatism is based on the decision to choose “life”. It is The Third Axiom of Evolutionary Pragmatism that the continued survival, and proliferation of our gene-pool over the long-term, maximizing our long term inclusive genetic fitness (LTIGF), is “A Good Thing” — the Summum Bonum of Ethics and Morals.
Applying the Principle: Establishing this principle of ethics does not imply that everyone, for every choice that presents, should attempt to figure out what available course of action will most likely maximize their own long term inclusive genetic fitness. Most of the time, we have either the time nor the energy to invest in this process. Over the course of millennia, however, we humans have discovered a long list of “rules of thumb” to help us. Rules such as “Do not steal!”, “Do not lie!”, “Do not cheat!”, and “Do not initiate force against members of your tribe!” are broadly accurate guides, based on experience or practice rather than theory, to help us on our way to achieve a “flourishing” life within a social environment. These, and others like them, are rules with broad application that are not intended to be strictly accurate or reliable for every situation. But they are intended to be easily learned and easily applied for indicating (approximately, most of the time) the course of action that will most likely achieve your own long term inclusive genetic fitness. History is replete with long lists of rules that people have discovered make their lives better. Rules that, by and large, at least approximately, allow them to better “flourish”. Examples include the Ten Commandments, the Golden Rule, Hammurabi’s Code, the collected sayings of Confucius and Buddha, and so forth.
Pleasure, happiness and joy are emotional responses that evolution has equipped us with to guide our choices towards our own LTIGF. Pain, sadness, and misery are likewise emotional responses that evolution has equipped us with to guide our choices away from behaviors that interfere with our LTIGF. That is why those emotions have evolved.
To a first approximation, within the environment in which we evolved, things that give us pleasure, enhance our happiness, and cause us joy are those things that evolutionary experience has demonstrated are in the best interests of our LTIGF. To a first approximation, within the environment in which we evolved, things that cause us pain, make us sad, and create misery are those things that evolutionary experience has demonstrated are not in the best interests of our LTIGF. If it were not for the fact that evolution has provided us with a proclivity to look upon helpless young children with feelings of happiness and joy, the first time the noisy, smelly, little parasites woke us out of a sound sleep for a 3:00 am feeding, would be the end of the species. And this evolutionary fact answers the Deep Genesis Challenge posed for a number of Ethical theories that rely on pleasure and pain as their basis — such as Hedonism, and Utilitarianism.
But our modern world is nothing like the hunter-gatherer tribal environment in which our emotional responses evolved. Now we have a much more complex physical and social environment to deal with. Now, in this day and age, it takes conscious attention to detail, much learning about how the world actually works, and an eye to long term consequences to serve the interests of our LTIGF as well as our genetic proclivities used to.
So it is to our advantage to use our leisure time, when pressures are not demanding, to contemplate various scenarios and discern and evaluate the best of the available alternatives. Forewarned is forearmed. Better decisions are made, not in the heat of the moment when our emotions respond blindly to genetically encoded cues, but at leisure when we have the time and resources to research obscure alternatives, and otherwise unforeseen consequences.
Setting up our own individual long term inclusive genetic fitness as the Summon Bonum of ethics and morality does not answer all moral questions. But it does establish a touchstone against which to judge any contemplated response to a moral scenario. Will you push the fat man off the bridge? Evolutionary Pragmatism now provides a way to approach answering that question.
Part 2 — Responding to the Objections
Objection #1: Morality Rises Above Our Genes
We can/must/should overcome our genetically endowed proclivities. We have the ability to choose other goals than those that derive from our genes. This is a common objection to Evolutionary Ethics. As is evidenced by –
“There is a persisting tension between the biological imperative of our genes on the one hand and the cultural imperatives of our memes on the other, but we would be foolish to “side with” our genes; that would be to commit the most egregious error of pop sociobiology. Besides, as we have already noted, what makes us special is that we, alone among species, can rise above the imperatives of our genes– thanks to the lifting cranes of our memes.” — Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life
“Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish. Let us understand what our own selfish genes are up to, because we may then at least have the chance to upset their designs, something that no other species has ever aspired to do.” — Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene
“Genes load the gun, but environment pulls the trigger. The idea that it’s all in your genes is nonsense. The human genome changes only one half of one percent every million years. The obesity epidemic is only about 30 years old, so changes in genes do not explain the recent dramatic rise in obesity, not only in this country but also worldwide.” — Dr. David Heber, of UCLA Center for Human Nutrition.
“Human well-being is not a random phenomenon. It depends on many factors – ranging from genetics and neurobiology to sociology and economics. But, clearly, there are scientific truths to be known about how we can flourish in this world. Wherever we can have an impact on the well-being of others, questions of morality apply.” — Sam Harris
As Daniel Dennett says above, “what makes us special is that we, alone among species, can rise above the imperatives of our genes.” Granted, we are certainly uniquely endowed with the ability to choose our moral goals, our moral imperatives. Clearly, these authors among many others, assume that we ought to “rise above the imperatives of our genes”. But on what basis do they assert that presumption? What moral imperative have they chosen that allows them to “rise above the imperatives of our genes”? And have they chosen wisely?
This objection, in fact, relies on a “deepity”. A “deepity” is a term coined by Daniel Dennett in his 2009 speech to the American Atheists Institution conference. He used the term to refer to an ambiguous proposition that on one level is true but trivially so, but on another level is apparently profound, and would be “earth-shattering” if true, but is actually false. To the extent that the proposition is true, it doesn’t matter. To the extent that the proposition matters, it isn’t true.
To the extent that this first objection is true, it is trivially true. Of course, it is trivially true that we have the ability to choose our goals, and evaluate the consequences of our behavior against standards of desirability that have nothing to do with the maximization of our long term inclusive genetic fitness. And of course, it is trivially true that it is not a good idea (even by the terms of Evolutionary Pragmatism) to cater to every proclivity that our genes have endowed us with, every time the opportunity presents. We are genetically endowed with a penchant for favouring foods which are fatty, sugary, and salty. This was an adaptive advantage when we were living in small tribes of hunter-gatherers, and such foods were hard to come by, and a valuable resource whenever encountered. In our modern (Western?) environment, however, where such foods are readily available, pursuing such foods it is not in the long term interests of the continued survival, and proliferation of our gene-pool. Obesity results, and obesity kills. Similarly, we are genetically endowed with a penchant for tribalistic “us versus them” thinking. This also was an adaptive advantage when we were living in family-centric tribes of hunter-gatherers, and “they” were almost always competitively (if not violently) dangerous to our family. But in our modern environment, where “they” are almost always a source of cooperative advantage, pursuing “us versus them” thinking is not in the long term interests of the continued survival and proliferation of our gene-pool. Hence it is trivially true that we should, in the interests of the maximization of our LTIGF, overcome many of our genetically provided proclivities in favour of our reasoned evaluations of the circumstances. Because our modern physical and social environment differs so dramatically from the environment within which we evolved, it is not surprising that many of our genetically provided emotional responses to circumstances are no longer suitable — no longer serve our LTIGF.
To the extent that this first objection is profound, it is false. To choose, as the basis for evaluating the desirability of the consequences of our actions, a standard that impedes our LTIGF, is to choose, ultimately, death. Consider the consequences of choosing a moral imperative, a standard of desirability, other than our LTIGF. An Ethical Subjectivist, whether of an individual variety or a social variety, maintains that Ethics and Morality are just matters of opinion. An Ethical Subjectivist, therefore has chosen as a moral goal or moral imperative, the satisfaction of their own personal emotional responses to circumstances. It all comes down to how one “feels” about a moral issue. But one’s emotional responses to circumstances are either learned or innate. If they are learned, from one’s parents, one’s church, or one’s social millieu, an Ethical Subjectivist is basing their moral choices on other peoples’ evaluations as to what is moral, not their own. And any cursory examination of the record will indicate that the overwhelming likelyhood is that their choices are intended to benefit their interests and not your own. If they are innate, then they are basing their moral choices on their genetically provided emotional proclivities. So much for “overcoming our genetically endowed proclivities”. Whether you are an aficionado of Subjectivist Ethics, Intuitive Command Ethics, Social Convention Ethics, or Social Contract Ethics, you are opting to evaluate the desirability of actions according to the criteria posited by others. And you have every reason to expect that other people’s opinions as to what is “good” for you to do, will turn out to be good for them, and not good for you and your LTIGF.
If, instead, you choose to follow one of the various Divine Command systems of Ethics, your conception of morality means that you are expected to evaluate the desirability of actions on the basis of whether those actions adhere to the Divine Commands (or “Glorify God”). And there is no expectation that one’s LTIGF will benefit from such actions. In fact, quite the opposite, since these rules have been documented and advertised by a set of individuals who have every interest in having you sacrifice your own best interests in favour of theirs.
In Kant’s Categorical Imperative conception of morality, Kant expects us to evaluate the desirability of actions on the basis of whether those actions are prompted by a sense of moral duty, and whether they correspond to the dictates of his Categorical Imperatives. A believer in Kant’s Categorical Imperatives notion of morality has chosen as their moral goal or moral imperative, following the dictates of their reasoned interpretation of Kant’s description of a Categorical Imperative. But a reasoned interpretation of Kant requires a pre-existing set of standards as to what is “reasonable”. And where do those pre-existing standards come from if not from your or others opinions as to what is reasonable?
Classical Utilitarianism would demand that you pursue as a moral goal the “greatest happiness of the greatest number”. Welfare Utilitarianism would demand that you pursue as a moral goal the “greatest welfare of the greatest number”. But notice that your own happiness or welfare (and by extension your own LTIGF) counts for little when the “greatest number” becomes large.
Egoism might be the closest approach, since it focuses on the individual’s “long term best interests”. Eudemonism, in the context of this discussion, can be viewed as a form of Egoism. The difference is that Eudemonism focuses on one’s own “flourishing” whereas Egoism focuses on ones “own best interests”. But again, how one conceptualizes one’s own “flourishing” or one’s own “best interests” will be critical in determining whether Eudemonism or Egoism is in fact compatible with one’s Long Term Inclusive Genetic Fitness. Clearly, it not obvious that a definition of “flourishing” or one’s own “best interests” in terms of LTIGF would be unacceptable.
The subscribers to Virtue Ethics, instead of conceiving of ethics and morality in terms of the best thing to do, conceive of ethics and morality in terms of the best kinds of character to display. But as with the other forms of Ethical Theory, Virtue Ethics must answer the “Deep Genesis” challenge — what is it that makes one set of character traits (or actions, or consequences) admirable, while others are not.
Response #1: The Deep Genesis Challenge
To all of the various Ethical Theories that have been floated by those who object to Evolutionary Ethics, the Deep Genesis Challenge asks — why have you chosen, as morally admirable, these particular moral standards, goals, or character traits? What is it about your chosen standards, that make them clearly superior to any other standards that others have chosen or might offer instead. More particularly, what is it about your own chosen set of moral standards, goals, or character traits that make them more admirable than Evolutionary Pragmatism’s Long Term Inclusive Genetic Fitness. If you are a Moral Subjectivist, why are your Moral Opinions preferable to mine? If you are one of the various Moral Collectivists, why should other peoples’ opinions hold sway over mine?
Evolutionary Pragmatism would argue that those moral attitudes that have evolved and survived to the modern times (like don’t lie, cheat or steal), are those attitudes that have been supportive of people’s own individual LTIGF. And those attitudes that have fallen by the wayside (like a positive attitude toward slavery, or racism, or women as property) interfered with people’s LTIGF. In other words, Evolutionary Pragmatism would reply to the Deep Genesis challenge by arguing that what makes one set of character traits, or actions, or consequences admirable, while others are not, is that those we have come to regard as admirable have demonstrated over time to be conducive to our own individual Long Term Inclusive Genetic Fitness.
Evolutionary Pragmatism does not suggest that this evaluation is done consciously and pragmatically. Rather it is the result of the species’ (or our collective genetic heritage) evolutionary experience over the generations. The things that make us happy, the things that we are attracted to, are those things that evolutionary pressures have proved to be conducive to our LTIGF. The things that make us sad, the things that disgust us, the things that we have learned to avoid, are those things that evolutionary pressures have proved to be contrary to our LTIGF.
Factual Premise: Human nature is shaped by evolution.
Ethical Premise: Judgments of right and wrong are made based on evolved biases, emotional attitudes, and related influences.
Conclusion: Examining human nature (facts) and the current circumstances (facts) can lead us to insight on right and wrong (ethics).
So the Rules endorsed by God or Authority (or at least the more generally accepted interpretations of those Rules) are not the result of whimsy. They are the rules that long experience over the generations has demonstrated are conducive to our collective LTIGF. And the moral opinions formed by individuals or the collective are those opinions that have proven, over the generations, to be conducive to our LTIGF. The Happiness pursued by the Utilitarians works as well as it does, because evolution has programmed us to be happy when we do things which are conducive to our LTIGF. Pursuing our own Best Interests, our collective Welfare, or our own Flourishing also works for the same reason. The entire concept of our own best interests, our own flourishing, is based on what is conducive to our LTIGF. At least in terms of the physical and social environment in which we evolved.
Homo Sapiens sapiens has been around as a species for about 250,000 years (give or take 20%)(7). For all but the latest 10,000 to 12,000 years or so, say about 5% of our history as a species, we have lived in a harsh physical environment in small family groups of hunter-gatherers. So it would be expected that our genetically endowed proclivities would be tuned to that sort of existence. We can see this in the obvious case of our predilection for sweet and fatty foods, and “us versus them” thinking. There are many aspects of our moral attitudes that are rooted in the small family group tribal environment. Recognizing this, and adapting those parochial attitudes to the modern international social environment is the real problem of Ethics and Morality. Recognizing the root of the problem is the first step in solving it however.
Hence Evolutionary Pragmatist Ethics does not offer a laundry list of Rules to obey or Goals to pursue. Evolutionary Pragmatist Ethics recognizes the genetic basis of what Ethics and Morals are for. Evolutionary Pragmatist Ethics acknowledges the many rules and attitudes that are commonly accepted, but recognizes that these are “Rules of Thumb” or “Interim Goals” useful in achieving the Summum Bonum of one’s own Long Term Inclusive Genetic Fitness. Evolutionary Pragmatist Ethics offers a foundation from which to challenge, examine, and improve those rules of thumb and interim goals when free of the time pressures and emotional baggage surrounding immediate Ethical problems. Evolutionary Pragmatist Ethics makes it possible to resolve any moral dilemma, at least in principle, if not in actual practice.
Objection #2: The Naturalistic Fallacy
The term “Naturalistic Fallacy” was introduced by British philosopher G. E. Moore in his 1903 book Principia Ethica(8).
“One of the shibboleths of contemporary philosophy is that you can’t derive ought from is. Attempting to do this is often called the naturalistic fallacy, taking the term from G. E. Moore’s classic Principia Ethica.” — Daniel C. Dennett(12)
Moore claimed that it would be fallacious to explain that which is “good” reductively in terms of natural properties such as “pleasant” or “desirable”. Defining the concept “good,” Moore argued, is impossible since it is a simple concept; a concept that cannot be defined in terms of any other concept. Moore likened the concept of “good” to the concept of “yellow” — which in his day could not be defined in terms of the frequency of light-waves. Simon Blackburn states that the naturalistic fallacy “consists of identifying an ethical concept with a ‘natural’ concept”(9). Robert Wright claims that the naturalistic fallacy involves “drawing values from evolution or, for that matter, from any aspect of observed nature”(10). Actually, there is not just one single argument that goes under the rubric of the Naturalistic Fallacy, but a whole slew of similar arguments: Moore’s Naturalistic fallacy is closely related to The Is–Ought Problem, which comes from David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature. Moving from is to ought is thus also known as Hume’s fallacy, Hume’s Law, or Hume’s Guillotine. One of the most famous passages in Hume’s book occurs at the end of section 3.1.1, ‘Moral Distinctions Not deriv’d from Reason’:
“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation,’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it … [I] am persuaded, that a small attention [to this point] wou’d subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason.”(11)
Another closely related form of argument often lumped together with the Naturalistic Fallacy, is that you can’t logically move from Facts to Values. This form is also known as the Fact-Value Distinction.
“The error in moving from facts to values — also known as committing the naturalistic fallacy, although strictly speaking this is the fallacy of defining values in terms of facts, rather than simply deducing values from facts …” — Peter Singer(13)
“The naturalistic fallacy rejects the possibility of deducing ethical statements from non-ethical statements. This principle, more precisely described as the fact/value dichotomy, denies the possibility of logically deriving what ought to be from what is.” — Howard Kendler(14)
Identifying Good with its Object, also known as Moore’s fallacy, is another form often encountered.
The naturalistic fallacy consists of confusing “the property of goodness with the things that possess that property or with some other property that good things possess” — Charles Pidgen(15)
An appeal to nature is a tactic which proposes that “a thing is good because it is natural”. It can be a fallacious argument, because the implicit unstated primary premise “What is natural is good” is typically irrelevant, or is an unsubstantiated opinion instead of an accepted fact. It generally requires a specific context of discourse, where natural and good are clearly defined in a specific context, for the appeal to nature to be a valid and cogent move.
The Open Question Argument purports to show that no moral property is identical to a natural property(16). The argument takes the form of syllogistic modus tollens:
Premise 1: If X is (analytically equivalent to) good, then the question “Is it true that X is good?” is meaningless (a tautology).
Premise 2: The question “Is it true that X is good?” is not meaningless (i.e. it is an open question).
Conclusion: X is not (analytically equivalent to) good.
Response #2: The Naturalistic Fallacy isn’t a Fallacy
The Naturalistic Fallacy, in all of its various forms, is not in fact a logical fallacy at all. It is based on G.E.Moore’s assumption that moral properties are essentially non-natural, indefinable, and not the same as natural properties. Hence, as a logical construct, the Naturalistic Fallacy commits the logical sin of “Begging the Question” — it assumes what it is trying to prove. William Frankena pointed out long ago, to say that someone commits the Naturalistic Fallacy begs the question(17). It assumes what it must prove, namely, that factual statements never entail ethical statements. But if moral terms actually mean the same as natural terms, one can indeed logically infer “ought” from “is”.
Ralph McInerny(18) has argued that “ought” is already bound up in “is”, in so far as understanding the very nature of things presupposes that they have teleology within them. For example, a clock is a device used to keep time. Its function is to keep time. Its teleology is to keep time. When one understands the function of a clock, then a standard of evaluation is implicit in the very description of the clock, i.e., because it “is” a clock, it “ought” to keep the time. Thus, if one cannot pick a good clock from a bad clock, then one does not really understand what a clock is. In like manner, if one cannot determine good human action from bad, then one does not really understand what the human person is. If the function of all living organisms is to ensure their genes make it into the next generation, then the goal of Homo sapiens (regardless of what other goals may be pursued along the way) is to ensure their genes make into the next generation. A (morally) Good human, therefore, is one that does a (functionally) Good job at doing so.
The Fact-Value Distinction rests on the presumption that Values are not of the same sort as Facts. Science can measure and explore facts. But Values are beyond their purview. But this position ignores the question of just what exactly Values are. From Wikipedia(19), we have
“In ethics, value denotes the degree of importance of some thing or action, with the aim of determining what actions are best to do or what way is best to live (normative ethics), or to describe the significance of different actions. …
“Values can be defined as broad preferences concerning appropriate courses of actions or outcomes. As such, values reflect a person’s sense of right and wrong or what ‘ought’ to be.”
This description of Values does nothing to provide an understanding of what moral values actually are. The philosopher Ayn Rand offers a more meaningful descriptions of Values —
“‘Value’ is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. The concept ‘value’ is not a primary; it presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what? It presupposes an entity capable of acting to achieve a goal in the face of an alternative. Where no alternative exists, no goals and no values are possible.”(20)
“‘Value’ is that which one acts to gain and keep, ‘virtue’ is the action by which one gains and keeps it. ‘Value’ presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what? ‘Value’ presupposes a standard, a purpose and the necessity of action in the face of an alternative. Where there are no alternatives, no values are possible.”(21)
Do we value things, actions, outcomes, or characters simply because it is our unjustified opinion that they are valuable? Or do we identify moral values because of what pursuing them will deliver? As an evolved species, we have evolved the facility of identifying aspects of the circumstances that are conducive to our LTIGF. Those things that we identify, and choose to act to gain or keep, we call “values”. Values are therefore aspects of the environment (social or physical) that we can identify and discriminate with our senses. What we value (morally) are those things that we discern are conducive to our LTIGF. We value safety, security, friends, family, acceptance, recognition, self-fulfillment — all the aspects of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. And we select these things to value (to act to gain or keep) because pursuing them aids our Flourishing. Values are therefore part of the world of facts.
The Open Question Argument fails as a critique of moral naturalism because it is based on assuming there is no referential opacity in the terms employed. This can be demonstrated by turning the argument around. As mentioned above, the concept of Long-Term Inclusive Genetic Fitness is a clearly defined concept within population genetics. So let’s try that concept in place of “Good” in the Open Question Argument:
Premise 1: If doing X actually does serve one’s LTIGF, then the question “Does X serve one’s LTIGF?” is meaningless.
Premise 2: The question “Does X serve one’s LTIGF?” is not meaningless (i.e. it is an open question).
Conclusion: X does not serve one’s LTIGF. (Which of course contradicts Premise 1)
Clearly, Premise 1 is in error here. It is quite conceivable that doing X does actually serve one’s LTIGF without one being cognisant of that fact. In fact it is quite a common occurance that one might do X without realizing that by so doing one is serving one’s LTIGF. Most people, most of the time, make their moral choices by referring to their stock of learned “rules-of-thumb”, and not by delving into what might be serving their long term inclusive genetic fitness. Take a simple example of the rule-of-thumb “don’t steal from your friends”. If you have an opportunity to make a choice based on that rule, by not stealing your friends wallet, how likely is it that you would have in your mind that you are making the choice on the basis of your LTIGF? Hence the question asked is not meaningless. Now go back to the Open Question argument. The question “Is X good?” is not meaningless if it is not apparent that X is (analytically equivalent to) good. Evolutionary Ethics is based on the argument that one’s LTIGF is in fact analytically equivalent to good. But it has taken this lengthy treatise to elucidate that fact. It is freely admitted that it is not a readily apparent equivalence. And in day to day operational decision making, it is not an eqivalence that can be readily determined.
“The naturalistic fallacy and Hume’s ‘law’ are frequently appealed to for the purpose of drawing limits around the scope of scientific inquiry into ethics and morality. These two objections are shown to be without force.” — Alex Walter(22)
Footnotes
(1) Unless otherwise specified, all dictionary definitions are quoted from The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Third Edition copyright © 1992 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Electronic version licensed from INSO Corporation; further reproduction and distribution restricted in accordance with the Copyright Law of the United States. All rights reserved.
(2) Plato, The Republic, A.D.Lindsay trans., Everyman’s Library, 1993, ISBN 978-0-679-41330-1.
(3) Tredennick, H, revd ed., The Ethics of Aristotle (1976) p. 63 and p. 72
(4) Hamilton, W. D. 1964 The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour I and II, J. Theor. Biol. v7, pp 1–16, and 17-52.
(5) What is a gene, post-ENCODE? History and updated definition, by Mark B. Gerstein, Can Bruce, Joel S. Rozowsky, Deyou Zheng, Jiang Du, Jan O. Korbel, Olof Emanuelsson, Zhengdong D. Zhang, Sherman Weissman, and Michael Snyder. URL=<http://genome.cshlp.org/content/17/6/669.full>.]
(6) A Digression into Genetics Theory
(7) Wikipedia contributors, “Homo sapiens,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, URL=https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Homo_sapiens&oldid=845907641 (accessed June 16, 2018).
(8) Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, Dover Publications, 2004, ISBN 978-0-486-43752-1.
(9) Blackburn S., Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1994, ISBN 978-0-199-54143-0. p. 255.
(10) Wright R., The Moral Animal: Why We Are the Way We Are: The new science of Evolutionary Psychology. New York: Pantheon Books. 1994, ISBN 978-0-679-76399-4. p330
(11) Hume, David (Ernest Mossner, Ed.) A Treatise of Human Nature. Penguin Books Inc., London, England. 1985. ISBN 0-140-43244-2.
(12) Dennett, D. C., Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the meanings of life. Touchstone Books, 1995, ISBN 0-684-82471-x, p. 467
(13) Singer, P., The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology, New American Library Inc., 1981. ISBN 0-452-00589-2. p. 74
(14) Kendler, Howard H., “Psychology and Ethics: Interactions and Conflicts,” Philosophical Psychology 15:4 (2002), p. 490.
(15) Pigden, Charles R., “What Naturalism Is” in Singer P. (Ed.), A Companion to Ethics: Volume 4 of Blackwell Companions to Philosophy, Blackwell Wiley, 1993. ISBN 978-0-631-18785-1. pp. 421–431.
(16) Copp, David (2001), Morality, Normativity, and Society, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-514401-7, p. 230.
(17) William Frankena, “The Naturalistic Fallacy,” Mind, 48, 1939 reprinted in Readings in Ethical Theory, (ed.) Sellars and Hospers, pp. 54-62.
(18) McInerny, Ralph (1982). Ethica Thomistica. Cua Press. p. Chp. 3.
(19) Wikipedia contributors. Value (ethics). Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. URL=<https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Value_(ethics)&oldid=845389095.> Accessed June 24, 2018.
(20) Rand, Ayn, The Virtue of Selfishness, Signet, Penguin Group, 1964, p 15
(21) Rand, Ayn, For the New Intellectual, Signet, Penguin Group 1963, p 121
(22) Walter, Alex (2006). “The Anti-naturalistic Fallacy: Evolutionary Moral Psychology and the Insistence of Brute Facts”. Evolutionary Psychology. 4: 33–48.