Essays from my University of London BA Philosophy Studies

Epistemology – [235P025]

1. Is knowledge justified true belief?
2. “Knowing that P is at least a matter of having a belief that P which is both true and justified.” Is this an adequate definition of knowledge? If not, how should it be improved?
3. Does knowledge involve having good reasons for one’s beliefs? What are ‘good reasons’?
4. Could it be that, though we use the same language to describe them, the things you see as red I see as green and vice versa?
5. ‘I cannot prove that I am not a brain in a vat. Therefore I do not know anything about the external world.’ Discuss.
6. “My beliefs could form a coherent set even if none of them is true, so the coherence account of knowledge must be wrong.”
7. Hilary Putnam provided a refutation of a version of the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, based upon semantic externalism. Is it effective?
8. “If every belief has to be justified by appeal to a different belief, some beliefs could not be justified. Hence, there must be foundational beliefs whose justification is independent of other beliefs.” Discuss.
9. Is knowledge closed under known implication?
10. What is the relation between perceiving the redness of a tomato and knowing that the tomato is red?
11. Much of what we ordinarily call knowledge involves information that we believe only on the basis of what others have told us – i.e., on the basis of testimony. What conditions have to be met for us to gain knowledge from the testimony of others?
12. Critically assess the claim that knowledge is belief which tracks the truth.
13. Does the argument from illusion show that there are no differences between the visual experiences involved in veridical perception, illusion, and hallucination?
14. Is the Truth of “P” Necessary for S to Know that “P”?

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