What basis is there if any, for distinguishing between
the illocutionary and the perlocutionary acts
performed by making an utterance?
In his 1962 book How to Do Things with Words, J.L.Austin defined three new terms that he proposed would assist in his adopted task of analyzing what it is we do with words. These terms have caught on, and are used extensively in philosophy today. The three terms Austin introduced are:
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Locution – refers to the literal or conventional meaning of the words uttered. In Austin’s summary, it is the act of saying something. If you ask me whether I am going to the party tonight, and I respond “I have to work tonight”, then my locutionary act was to utter the words that I have to work tonight. Austin further analyzes a locutionary act as comprising a phonetic, a phatic and a rhetic act corresponding to the verbal/auditory, syntactic, and semantic aspects of the speech act.
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Illocution – refers to the effect the speaker intends to achieve in making the utterance. In Austin’s summary, it is the act done in saying something. By uttering the words (performing the locutionary act) “I have to work tonight” I am telling you (performing the illocutionary act) that I am not going to the party. Austin claims that to perform a locutionary act is eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act. In Gricean terms, a locutionary act focuses on the conventional meaning of the uttered words, while the illocutionary act focuses on the intended conversational implicature of the utterance.
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The illocutionary force of an utterance is the speaker’s intention in performing the locutionary act. An illocutionary act is an instance of a culturally-defined speech act type, characterised by a particular illocutionary force. For example, promising, advising, warning, etc. In 1975, John Searle used Austin’s concept of “illocutionary force” to set up a classification of illocutionary speech acts that has also become widely accepted in the literature:
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“assertives” are acts that commit a speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition;
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“directives” are acts that are intended to cause the audience to take a particular action — illocutionary acts intended to be perlocutionary acts by causing the audience to take some action;
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“commissives” are acts that commit the speaker to some future action;
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“expressives” are acts that express the speaker’s attitudes and emotions towards the proposition;
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“declarations” are acts that change the reality in accordance with the proposition of the declaration.
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In 1985, Searle and Vanderveken provided a detailed analysis of illocutionary force, and documented seven features they claimed defined all possible variations of illocutionary force. For this essay, I need not go into that detail.
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Perlocution – refers to the actual effect of the utterance upon the audience — how it is received by the listener. In Austin’s summary, it is the act done by saying something. In Austin’s words, a perlocutionary act occurs when a speaker says something that produces “an effect on the feelings, thoughts, or actions of his audience”. The “perlocution” of a speech act (my telling you that “I have to work tonight”) is the way it is received by the audience — the way in which you understand the meaning of what it is I utter. In Grice’s terminology, the “perlocution” of my utterance is how the audience understands the utterance, including all conventional and conversational implicature of my utterance. My illocutionary act is to tell you that I am not going to the party tonight by performing the locutionary act of uttering “I have to work tonight”. But my speech act has a perlocutionary component only if you understand my intent, and accept that I will not attend the party tonight.
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As a further example, consider the actions involved when I yell “Low Bridge!”. My locutionary act is to utter the words “low bridge”. My illocutionary act is to warn you to duck. My perlocutionary act (if successful), is to cause you to duck. Austin makes it clear, however, that it is not necessary for the consequences produced by an utterance to be intentional for there to be a perlocutionary act involved in the utterance. If my utterance was instead “Gee! Look at that beautiful bridge!”, and you still ducked, then I still performed the perlocutionary act of getting you to duck — even though that was not my intention.
The distinction between the illocutionary act and the perlocutionary act is the distinction between my (the speaker’s) intention, and your (the audience’s) response to an understanding of my intention. A perlocutionary act is one that is the cause of an effect on the audience. But notice that in defining perlocutionary acts as involving an effect of a cause, Austin is here using “cause” in a sense different from the normal physical sense. Austin claims that there are two senses of “cause”, a physical and a non-physical sense. It is the latter which is relevant to his distinction between illocutions and perlocutions. He is thus using the notion of “cause” in its customary or sociological (arguably, the original) sense. In this sense of the word, that which is caused is the free and deliberate act of a conscious and responsible agent. “Causing” you to do something means affording you a motive for doing it. The argument I voice to support my position is an illocutionary act. My convincing you (if I do) is my perlocutionary act.
