Essays from my University of London BA Philosophy Studies
Philosophy of Mind – [235P100]
- ‘If mental causes were not physical, they would be epiphenomenal.’ Discuss.
- What, if anything, would Frank Jackson’s Mary learn on seeing something red for the first time? If she learns something, does that show that physicalism is false?
- What is the ‘explanatory gap’ and does it cast doubt on the truth of materialism?
- What exactly does Jackson’s Mary learn when she leaves her black and white room?
- “Zombies are conceivable. So they are possible. So physicalism is false.” Discuss.
- “If I am thinking about Santa Claus, then there is something I am thinking about. But Santa Claus does not exist, so I am thinking about nothing.” Discuss.
- “Token identity is too weak to explicate physicalism and type identity is too strong.” Discuss.
- “Functionalism is no better than behaviourism as a theory of the mental.” Discuss.
- What do Frege cases and/or Twin Earth cases show about intentionality?
- Does intentionality admit of naturalistic explanation?